## Approved For Release 2009/98/29 : CIA-RDP79-01154A000100040002-4

6 May 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Basic and Geographic Intelligence

SUBJECT

: Geography Division Portion of IG Survey

Team Report

l. I agree with work. To George's own thoughtful comments, I would add only a few, essentially amplifying, observations, as follows (references are to George's paragraph numbers).

25X1A9a

- 2. Paragraph 3. So far as I can remember, rotational interchange between components of the DDI (other than between staffs like IRS and line) has never been seriously considered, for the reasons that George adduces. What has been considered is rotational interchange between the several directorates, particularly between DDP and DDI. Many of us have felt such an interchange was practicable, but other considerations, probably including DDP reluctance, have kept it from developing much beyond the idea stage.
- 3. Paragraph 5. I evidently failed to make an impression when I briefed the IG Survey Team on the dynamics of change in geographic intelligence over the years. Their "little evidence of innovation" omits the shift of emphasis away from long reports to short support pieces, the reorientation of our research toward policy support, and the launching of the Geographic Brief Series. I accept the judgment that we could have done more.
- 4. Paragraph 6. The "signs of a developing schism" were mainly detected, I suspect, when the younger analysts in F were interviewed. At that time, several people in F and S were disturbed because of the negative, even hostile, views of older analysts towards quantitative methodology, computer-assisted data handling, etc. I subsequently received a delegation of dissidents from F and successfully corrected their assumption that such views reflected those of branch or division management. We remain confronted by a gap, however (I wouldn't call it a "schism"), as are other DDI offices also. I think we may need to loosen the reins more, to be willing to risk more waste effort, in order to establish our own openness

## Approved For Belease 2000/08/29: CIA-RDP79-01154A000100040002-4

## EYES ONLY

and motivation. To do this, we would need understanding from higher management, since time pressures and priorities still hold. As for "public relations," I don't know what can be done beyond upgrading the quality of the formal office presentations, continuing to interact as frequently as possible with our colleagues, and maintaining the quality and pertinency of our output. More shouldn't be needed. I disagree with George about the value of close relations with the academic world. This activity concerns quite additional values, it seems to me.

- 5. Paragraph 8. The rule that drafts must be reviewed and edited prior to coordination is nowadays more honored in the breach than in the observance. It was needed once, but not so much now. It is a failure on my part not to have formally rescinded the rule and delegated to branch chiefs the decision as to whether a draft should be run farther down the line internally before exposing it to critical eyes of coordinators. At present, I usually look at drafts before they go out, but prior editing is generally applied only to GM's, and then only if time is not critical.
- outlook rather than detection of a GD problem. We have considered the idea before, as you know, and I would conclude again that an intelligence team operation doesn't need it and may be better off without it. I don't want to encourage some people to seek brownie points through multiplying publication for its own sake; nor others to feel left out because their DoD-published intelligence maps aren't signed; nor any analyst to slight the informal ask-type of substantive aid that is so important in our contribution to CIA. OSI seems to be differently structured, and in a different environment. As George says, all of the DDI would have to make the change.
- 7. Paragraph 10. The IG Survey Team never checked back with me on questions they encountered. It is particularly unfortunate that they didn't do so with respect to the IMP, since their account here contains some surprising distortions. We obviously have Division communications problems, but I feel with George that the Division at large is quite clear about the IMP. I have met with each branch each year for the past two years, and have gone into the IMP task -- its parameters, purposes, and problems -- in detail each time in response to questions. I am most concerned about the impression that non-IMP projects are discouraged. In fact, we have robbed from the Program quite consistently; any clearly needed research project, whether research support for S&T or a

25X1A9a

25X1A9a

## Approved For Belease 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79-01154A000100040002-4

self-initiated input to an NIE, is put ahead of the IMP. But there is so much that is desirable to do, it is understandable that some analysts can resent any manhours withheld for the IMP.

- 8. Paragraph 11. Index always encouraged branch chiefs and analysts to check ideas out beforehand with their main beneficiary as a matter of common sense. It double-checks their judgment, it assures the project plan is well conceived in terms of needs of which we may be unaware, and it justifies management in taking the analyst off another project which has its own priority. At times, he have asked for a formal request, so that he and yet know that an expensive project we're approving is backed by something more than someone's personal interest. If this sometimes seems to be "selling," I don't mind.
- 9. Paragraph 15. Re the IMP schedule, it has always represented a projection on the basis of presently known conditions; e.g., at any one time, the production schedule is firm. As a "goal," the schedule necessarily changes as circumstances change. Our charge is to complete it ASAP, and the "moving feast" nature of the projected completion doesn't change that. That it may be time for a reaffirmation of community need for the program as presently conceived is, however, suggested by this Survey Team comment.
- 10. Paragraph 16. Our statistical record activity responds less, it seems to me, to what OBGI demands of us than what we get through OBGI from O/DDI (budget planning papers), O/DCI (program justifications, briefings), and BoB (special program briefings). The statistics also enable us to offer a reasonable picture of what we do in relative order of importance, and the changes thereof, in office training lectures and briefings. It's a burden, but a slight one so far as actual analyst suffering is concerned. I propose to see whether we can usefully cut it back (e.g., cover only applied project time); I would not eliminate it.

25X1A9a

